3 February 1953

Mr. Raymond P. Whearty Chairman, Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security 2107 Department of Justice

Subject: Re National Intelligence Estimate on Certain Soviet Capabilities

Dear Mr. Whearty:

In response to your letter of 21 January (ICIS-P25/122), I am proposing to the Intelligence Advisory Committee the initiation of a National Intelligence Estimate on the lines you request. This will require an initial appraisal of the technological possibilities, followed by a study of Soviet agent capabilities for introduction of weapon components, together with an appraisal of Soviet capabilities for assembly and detonation of weapons once introduced.

Every effort will be made to produce this estimate by 15 March, if this meets with your requirement. In any event, matters of scope and deadlines will be up for discussion when the IAC agencies are asked to consider this problem. I have asked our Office of National Estimates to notify you of this meeting so that you can be represented.

I should like to call your attention to the connection between this proposal and the MSC 140 project for a new summary evaluation of the net capability of the USSR to injure the continental United States. The Edwards Subcommittee, on which ICIS and this agency will both be represented, will also need this estimate for its work, and I urge that you use the CIA representative on this committee as a direct channel for discussion of the progress and scope of this estimate. With particular reference to your request that the estimate cover the degree of threat from clandestine attack in relation to military attack, I doubt whether this question could be satisfactorily answered without a better

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Approved For Retease 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79S01057A000500100006-1

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picture than the intelligence community now has of the possible effectiveness of Soviet military attack. This point will be developed during the work of the Edwards Subcommittee and I suggest that you postpone consideration of it until the subcommittee's work is well advanced.

I have noted the recommendation on page 10 of the Special Committee report, to which you call my attention in your closing paragraph. We are referring this matter to the Interdepartmental Priorities Committee which is charged with setting intelligence priorities.

Sincerely yours,

Deputy Director/Intelligence

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